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Abstract 
Traditionally, fundamental human rights have occupied an important place 
in labor law. The ILO constitution of 1919 focuses, for example, on the 
right of freedom of association. Subsequent ILO documents stress other 
fundamental rights such as the right to non-discrimination in the field of 
labor. The fundamental rights of the worker did begin to get some attention 
in the EU too, especially in non-binding documents such as the Community 
Charter of the Rights of the Worker from 1989. Since the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights introduced 
at the summit in Nice is legally binding to the same extent as the EU Treaty 
itself. The Charter includes fundamental rights in the field of labor law 
under the heading ‘solidarity’. In this article two basic questions will be 
addressed. The first question will address the ‘old’ issue of the clash 
between fundamental (labor) rights and the four economic freedoms of the 
EU, which are seen by the ECJ as of fundamental nature as well. Since the 
seminal cases of Viking and Laval, a lot has been written about this theme 
by both European and labor lawyers. I will not revisit the literature that has 
been written about these cases, but the more dogmatic issue of a (potential) 
clash between the four economic freedoms and the fundamental rights is 
still in need of clarification. The second question is whether the fundamental 
human rights will get a more important place in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice now that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is of 
binding character, or, will there be just a continuation of the already 
developed relationship between fundamental freedoms and rights or 
between two different kind of fundamental human rights? I will focus here 
on case law in the field of labor law. The article will finish with a plea for a 
proportionality test ‘light’ in order to limit the interference of EU law with 
the essence of fundamental rights.  
A. Introduction 
Human rights have gradually assumed increasing importance in EU 
law (considered to be an autonomous legal order since the seminal decisions 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the cases Van Gend & Loos 
(26/62) and Costa/ENEL (6/64)1 in the first half of the 1960s). First they 
 
1  [1963] ECR 1 and [1964] ECR 585 respectively. 
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were considered to be a part of the constitutional traditions of all the 
Member-States. Through that comparative law route, they became general 
principles of law and thereby an independent source of European law. The 
coexistence of a separate European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
with a court in Strasbourg might cause problems in the near future. The 
entering into force of the EU-Treaty of Lisbon of December 2009 can either 
solve or exacerbate these problems. Article 6 Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)2 considers the provisions in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU of 20003 to have ‘the same value’ as the Treaty itself. The fundamental 
rights of the ECHR are treated as general principles of law of the Union in 
article 6, paragraph 3 TEU.  
In European labor law, the ECJ has given the general principles of law 
an extremely prominent place. We only have to consider cases such as 
Mangold.4 Some fundamental rights were already well-established from the 
very beginning. Non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and equal 
pay between men and women were the most important examples to be 
found already in the original EEC Treaty5 of 1958. For these rights there 
was no need to resort to general principles of law. The same is true for the 
so-called four economic freedoms. 
We will study the ‘fundamental’ nature of the four economic freedoms 
first. Because of their ‘fundamental’ nature, the economic freedoms interact 
with human rights, which are also of a fundamental nature. What is the 
meaning of the term ‘fundamental’ in this respect? Do there exist several 
layers of ‘fundamental-ness’?6 Second, the effect of the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty with respect to fundamental rights will be studied. Is the 
role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the ECJ now 
different? Is there a quiet evolution in EU law or is there something going 
 
2  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007, O.J. C 
83/13 (2010) [TEU]. 
3  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, O.J. 
C364/1 (2000) [ECHR]. 
4  Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, [2005] ECR I-9981. 
5  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11. 
6 T. Kingreen, ‘Theorie und Dogmatik der Grundrechte im europäischen 
Verfassungsrecht‘, 31 Europäische-Grundrechte Zeitschrift (2004) 19, 570, 572 talks 
about the fundamental economic freedoms as a ‘second layer of fundamental rights’. 
This, however, raises the question of the hierarchy between the two categories of 
rights. Does second mean second place?  
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on that has to be analysed more rigorously?7 Does the now binding Charter 
add something or is it only a codifying instrument? We will study this by 
analyzing case law in the field of European labor law since December 2009 
in which the provisions of the Charter have been explicitly mentioned. I will 
end this contribution with a plea for a proportionality-test ‘light’ in order to 
protect fundamental human rights. 
B. The ‘Fundamental’ Nature of the four Economic 
Freedoms and the Human Rights in the Charter 
The four economic freedoms are of a fundamental nature. They are the 
pillars of the EU. Without these freedoms the internal market would become 
a fiction, as would the realization of an area without internal frontiers 
(Article 26 (2) TFEU).8 In the case-law of the ECJ the fundamental nature 
of the four freedoms had gradually been established even before 1985, when 
the Single European Act was concluded in which ‘the area without internal 
frontiers’ was inserted in the Treaty. An example is the case Dassonville 
from 1974 and also Casati from 1981 is important in this respect.9 What 
does the notion ‘fundamental’ mean in this respect? Is the notion used in the 
same way as in ‘fundamental (human) rights’? Although both might 
overlap, a difference in focus will without doubt exist.10 Fundamental 
human rights are those human rights that are linked to the basic dignity of 
human beings. Fundamental freedoms are primarily linked to the realization 
of the internal market. Fundamental freedoms are functional rights, they are 
considered to serve a certain purpose. The ECJ sometimes even refers to 
economic freedoms as fundamental principles of the Community itself.11 
Sauter and Schepel submit that the word ‘fundamental’ has only been used 
 
7 As J. Morijn expects per definition in his article ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and 
Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of 
the European Constitution‘, 12 European Law Journal (2006) 1, 15. 
8  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007, O.J. C 
83/13 (2010) [TEU]. 
9  Case 8/74, Public Prosecutor v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837 and 
Case 203/80, Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati, [1981] ECR 2595 
respectively. 
10  C. Walter, ‘Geschichte und Entwicklung der Europäischen Grundrechte’, in D. Ehlers 
(ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 3rd ed. (2009), No. 42. 
11  As for example in Case 220/83, Commission v. France, [1986] ECR 3663. 
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by the ECJ to “forcefully impose the internal market rules upon the 
member-states”.12  
Nevertheless, in the structure of the Treaty the four economic 
freedoms have an important role. The four freedoms had a prime stage at the 
beginning of the EC-Treaty.13 Fundamental human rights have also had a 
place even earlier in that Treaty, as in Article 6 TEU. In the Lisbon-Treaty 
this has changed. In Article 6 (1) of the EU Treaty, the same legal value as 
the Treaties is given to fundamental human rights in the Charter. Only in 
part III of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU do we find the 
fundamental freedoms. The first two parts of the TFEU concern the general 
principles and non-discrimination including European citizenship. This 
position of the internal market rules in the new Treaty is not spectacular. 
The internal market is only qualified as one of the ‘policies’ of the EU. It is 
nowhere established in the text of the Treaty that these freedoms are 
‘fundamental’. 
This implies that the main driver behind the fundamental-ness of the 
four economic freedoms was and still is the ECJ. It is submitted that the 
word ‘fundamental’ has been introduced by the ECJ to enlarge the scope of 
the Treaty.14 Ehlers is of another opinion in this respect. In no situation do 
the fundamental freedoms operate as the creation or widening of a 
competence.15 The four freedoms consist of broad principles and narrow 
exceptions, as if the adage in dubio pro communitate is still relevant. The 
wider the scope of the principles, the more the Member-States will be forced 
to justify their legislation and administrative measures. Proof of this 
development of the widening scope of the fundamental economic freedoms 
is that these freedoms are also applied to sensitive policy issues like direct 
taxation, labor law and the law concerning social security. Even in case the 
Union has no competencies in an area, the four freedoms are still applied. 
The Member-States have a certain discretionary freedom to make policies 
where they still have competencies. Nevertheless, these competencies must 
be fulfilled within the framework of the four economic freedoms. Ehlers is 
therefore not completely right in that the four freedoms cannot enlarge the 
 
12  W. Sauter & H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union law: the public and 
private spheres of the internal market before the EU Courts (2009), 11. 
13  Treaty Establishing the European Community, 7 February 1992, 1 Common Market 
Law Review (1992) 573 [ECT]. 
14  As Sauter and Schepel submit, supra note 12. 
15  D. Ehlers, ‘Die Grundfreiheiten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in D. Ehlers (ed.), 
Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten 3rd ed. (2009), 230, No. 39. 
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scope of the Treaty. The competencies that the Member States still possess 
will have to be implemented and enforced taking into account the four 
freedoms. It is as if an additional layer of oversight is put on the activities of 
the Member-States and economic and other operators. In this way, the four 
economic freedoms have become a kind of superstructure. There is still a 
discretionary freedom for the Member-States, but it is subject to limits. In 
this respect Rigaux and Buelens use the term ‘infralaw’: but for free 
movement of persons, which is one of the four freedoms itself, European 
labor and social security law are infralaw. They submit that there is a 
hierarchical relation between the internal market and competition law on the 
one hand and labor and social security law on the other hand.16 The first 
category is more important. In my view it is certainly possible that through 
this category European labor and social security law are ‘reframed’ by the 
ECJ. This is not the same as a clear hierarchy between different areas of the 
law.So the freedoms must be of a fundamental nature if they can reframe 
other areas of law. That even minor restrictions of the economic freedoms 
are prohibited also proves the fundamental character of the freedoms.17 In 
this respect the ECJ has always refused to accept a de minimis-exception in 
the area of the four freedoms. This exception, derived from competition law, 
allows small effects on competition not to be taken into account. Small or 
only potential effects on free movement of goods or services caused by a 
national measure does not prevent the measure to be caught by the prima 
facie ban on all discriminatory or restrictive measures.18 Any kind of 
infringement or inhibition is sufficient to trigger the application of the 
freedoms.  
The de minimis-exception is often confused with the lack of a 
sufficient cross-border element. If there is no cross-border element, there is 
no free movement at all. In that situation, there is an insufficient link to one 
of the freedoms. The link is too uncertain and too indirect to be caught by 
the Treaty provisions on free movement.19 The de minimis-exception is a 
 
16  M. Rigaux & J. Buelens, ‘Can a Stronger Anchoring of European Labour Law and 
Social Security Law to Community Law Guarantee a Sustainable European Social 
Model?‘, in F. Pennings et al. (eds), Social Responsibility in Labour Relations. 
European and Comparative Perspectives. Liber Amicorum for Teun Jaspers (2008), 
26. 
17  Sauter & Schepel, supra note 12, 11. 
18  See for example case C-67/97, Criminal proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme, [1998] 
ECR I-8033. 
19  See for example case C-379/92, Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta, [1994] 
ECR I-3453. 
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quantitative criterion, while the ‘too uncertain, too indirect” exception is a 
qualitative criterion.  
Even the cross-border element becomes somewhat irrelevant if we 
study recent case law. Especially concerning (a) free movement of persons 
or services (where a personal element is at stake) and (b) European 
citizenship, an element of human rights is involved too. An example is the 
case of Angonese, where the cross-border element was quite thin.20 
Angonese was an Italian who was required to present a specific certificate 
of German language proficiency. This certification could only be obtained 
in Italy in order to participate in a vocational training course leading to a job 
with a bank in Italy. But he had obtained certification much earlier in 
Vienna, Austria. The ECJ seems to focus here on those who are generally in 
the same situation as Angonese. It is only a coincidence that he is an Italian. 
Any other European citizen moving to another Member State could be 
confronted with the same kind of trouble as Angonese had in Italy. 
Especially in the areas of free movement of persons and European 
citizenship, the convergence with fundamental human rights is significant.21  
While the four freedoms have been interpreted by the ECJ in an 
extremely broad and comprehensive manner from the 1970s onwards, the 
attention to fundamental human rights is of a later date. The fundamental 
nature of human rights has been finally established in the old EU-Treaty and 
the Lisbon-Treaty. The origin of protection of human rights within the EEC 
has been rather difficult, because the fundamental human rights were not 
mentioned in the original Treaty. Only through a method of comparative 
law, by looking at the national constitutional traditions of the Member-
States, the ECJ was able to apply fundamental human rights in the early 
years of the EEC. The national constitutional traditions of the Member-
States were transferred to the European level through the form of general 
principles of law. General principles of law have always played a major role 
in the development of Community law, probably due to the rudimentary 
stage in which the legal order of the Community was at that time. In the 
Wachauf of 1989 and ERT cases of 1991 the role of fundamental human 
rights (in the form of general principles of law) was that the Member-States 
were bound to adhere to these principles when they implemented 
 
20  Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139. 
21  See also Kingreen, supra note 6, 572. European citizenship implies free movement of 
persons without an economic context. 
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Community law.22 Moreover, the principles fulfilled a role in testing 
whether a restrictive or discriminatory measure could still be objectively 
justified.  
This second role of the principles is a way to solve potential clashes 
between an economic freedom and a fundamental human right. This implies 
that a solution to the clash, de lege lata, is only possible at the stage of the 
justification and in order to arrive at that stage, the existence of a prima 
facie restriction to one of the economic freedoms has to be established. 
Prima facie, at first face, is a notion often used in law. Its precise meaning 
is, however, disputed. According to Dammann it is a rule of 
argumentation.23 A prima facie restriction implies a general inclination of 
the measure to restrict one of the economic freedoms. This implies that the 
measure is contrary to the Treaty, unless individual and less general 
arguments specific to the case at hand lead to another outcome. This view is 
better than the one suggesting that the prima facie test is only an 
intermediate test and that the real test is at the justification stage. The prima 
facie test only focuses on the general inclination of a rule; it only takes into 
account the consequences for the internal market. It is a one-dimensional 
test. It is at the level of the subsequent justification stage that all the facts of 
the case become relevant, including fundamental human rights. And during 
that stage the proportionality principle fulfills a crucial role.  
The only exception is the situation where a restriction to a 
fundamental human right itself hinders an economic fundamental freedom. 
An example is the case of Carpenter where a British service-provider 
showed that his provision of services within the Community was dependent 
on his family life.24 A refusal of the British government to let his wife of 
Filipino nationality stay in the UK became thereby a condition under which 
he could exercise a fundamental economic freedom. The right to a family 
life recognized in article 8 ECHR became linked to the provision of services 
in the Community. 
The development of European citizenship is another field in which 
human rights and economic freedoms could become reconciled at the first 
 
22  Cases 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany, [1989] ECR 2609 and C-260/89, Elliniki 
Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas, 
[1991] ECR I-2925 respectively. 
23  J. Dammann, Materielles Recht und Beweisrecht im System der Grundfreiheiten 
(2007), 210. 
24  Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] ECR 
I-6279.  
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prima facie level. The Zambrano case25 is an example of this. Without 
having utilized the economic freedoms within the EU, Belgium could not 
refuse the right of residence and the right to work and a work permit to a 
Colombian father of a child who had obtained Belgian citizenship and 
therefore became ipso facto an EU citizen. This outcome is the ultimate 
consequence of the point of view of the ECJ that Union citizenship is the 
central capacity of the subjects of the Member States. Apart from this 
citizenship, Article 8 ECHR must have played a role. 
This situation is exceptional though. For all other situations the 
original framework developed by the ECJ will still be used. Fundamental 
human rights will have their full weight only during the second justification 
stage. This way of testing seems due only to the fact that the fundamental 
freedoms were developed earlier in Community law than the fundamental 
human rights as general principles of law. Now that the ECJ has such a huge 
experience with interpreting the four economic freedoms, the interpretation 
of fundamental human rights will have to be adapted in one way or another 
to this huge experience. This implies that necessity and proportionality are 
extremely important principles to interpret fundamental human rights as 
well. There are different ways in which to apply the proportionality test. The 
suitability or appropriateness test focuses on the effectiveness of the 
measure in attaining its objective. The necessity test focuses on the question 
whether the measure is really necessary and whether there is an alternative 
that is less severe for the economic freedoms. The most intrusive test is the 
proper proportionality test: this involves a balancing of conflicting 
interests.26 It is submitted here that fundamental human rights should not be 
subjected to the most intrusive test. The ECJ should use some self-restraint 
in this respect.  
An interesting example in the area of labor law is the Schmidberger-
case.27 Demonstrations in Austria blocked imports and thereby the free 
movement of goods. The Austrian government did not immediately 
intervene to end the demonstration, because it wanted to pay respect to 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of assembly and the freedom to 
expression. The ECJ had to reconcile these fundamental rights with the free 
movement of goods, which was characterized again as having a 
‘fundamental role […] in particular for the proper functioning of the internal 
 
25  Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi, [ECJ 8 March 2011] 
(Court decision not yet reported). 
26  See in this respect J.H. Jans et al., Europeanisation of Public Law (2007), 152. 
27  Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, [2003] ECR I-5659. 
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market’.28 The two fundamental human rights at stake are not absolute and 
therefore it must be shown whether the restrictions to the free movement of 
goods are proportionate in relation to their social purpose. In this case they 
were: the demonstrations were approved, alternatives were considered 
beforehand by the Austrian authorities, traffic was deviated, etc. The rights 
expressed through the demonstrations could be safeguarded. In the earlier 
case Commission v. France the outcome was different.29 The French 
government did not do anything to alleviate the consequences of a strike on 
imports to France. Governments have a positive duty to realize the 
freedoms. Although other parties, such as the collective partners, may 
implement directives or start a strike, it is the Member-State that is 
responsible for the actual implementation and enforcement of EU law.  
These two cases have been criticized firmly in the literature. The road 
would be open now for the degradation of fundamental human rights such 
as the right of assembly. Fundamental human rights would be lowered to the 
level of economic efficiency arguments and fundamental rights would only 
become a last resort, because means that are less restrictive to the free 
movement of goods would prevail.30 On the other hand, the ECJ makes an 
explicit distinction in Schmidberger between fundamental rights in the 
ECHR that allow a restriction, such as the freedom of assembly, and others 
such as torture, that do not permit a derogation.31 Case law of the Strasbourg 
Court of Human Rights on certain fundamental rights will probably not 
change this32. That Court interprets fundamental human rights, whereas the 
ECJ tries to balance economic freedoms and fundamental rights. In the EU 
system both kinds of rights are comparable but not equal. Both are directly 
 
28  Id., para. 60. 
29  Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959. 
30  See for example J. Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market 
Freedoms in Union Law‘, 12 European Law Journal (2006) 1, 15. 
31  Schmidberger v. Austria, supra note 27, para. 80. 
32  The case of the European Court of Human Rights in Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 
[2008] ECHR 1345, in which the right of collective bargaining is qualified as an 
‘essential element’ of the right to freedom of association in Art. 11 ECHR, led to 
comments in the literature. K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy argue that this might have 
consequences for the ECJ case law as well. See their ‚The Dramatic Implications of 
Demir and Baykara‘, 39 Industrial Law Journal (2010) 1, 2, 40. I doubt this, because 
in Demir and Baykara there was an absolute prohibition on forming trade unions 
imposed on civil servants in Turkey and the right of those unions to participate in 
collective bargaining. In the ECJ case law there is not often an absolute prohibition on 
the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining or the right to strike. 
These rights are ‘only’ balanced with the economic freedoms.  
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effective in the legal orders of the Member-States and citizens are able to 
refer to these freedoms before their national courts. To qualify the four 
freedoms as lex specialis of the fundamental human rights, as Ehlers seems 
to do, is in my opinion one step too far.33 Normally the lex specialis has 
preference to the lex generalis. Ehlers is, however, right in arguing that the 
fundamental human rights receive a Europe-friendly interpretation by the 
ECJ. They are reframed. The fundamental economic freedoms are about 
creating Europe. That is their specific aim. That these freedoms should be 
completely separated from fundamental human rights, as Kingreen suggests 
vehemently,34 is difficult to uphold. Morijn thinks that the approach of the 
ECJ in reconciling freedoms and human rights “will have to fundamentally 
change” in case these human rights get a place in the new EU Treaty.35 I 
doubt whether Morijns’ argument is right. I submit that the way the ECJ 
tests fundamental rights is not that different before and after the entering 
into force of the Lisbon-Treaty in December 2009. Will the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights really be treated as a new element, now that the ECJ 
has more than 60 years of experience in adjudicating cases? Now that the 
Lisbon Treaty is in force, let us have a look at some of the case law of the 
ECJ.  
C. Testing of Fundamental Human Rights in European 
Labor Law Before the Entry into Force of the 
Lisbon-Treaty 
I consider the main cases in the field of (European) labor law, in 
which fundamental human rights as general principles of law have been 
used as a source of inspiration, to be the cases UK v. Council and BECTU.36 
In the first case the UK government complained about the then new working 
time directive 93/104/EC,37 which the other Member-States in the Council 
voted for with qualified majority voting, because the legal basis of working 
conditions was used. It considered the legal basis of employment rights to 
 
33  As Ehlers does. See Ehlers, supra note 15, 217- 218, No. 18. See also chapter 14 of D. 
Ehlers (ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 448-449, No. 13. 
34  Kingreen, supra note 6, 574-576.  
35  Morijn, supra note 30, 40. 
36  Cases C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, [1996] ECR I-5755 and C-173/99, The 
Queen v. BECTU, [2001] ECR I-4881 respectively. 
37  Council Directive 93/194/EC, OJ 1993 L 307/18. 
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be a more appropriate legal base, as working times and the maximum 
working week concern also and mostly workers’ rights. Use of that legal 
base would require unanimity of votes within the Council. The Commission, 
however, maybe for tactical reasons, preferred the legal base concerning 
working conditions. A qualified majority of Member-States supported the 
Commission in this. The ECJ was of the opinion that working conditions 
should not be interpreted in a narrow manner. A limitation on the number of 
working hours per week (and day) and sufficient hours of rest is perfectly 
capable of being related to working conditions. The ECJ opted for a 
Scandinavian view of working conditions and also mentioned an 
international treaty concluded by all the then Member-States within the 
framework of the World Health Organization (WHO). Although 
fundamental human rights were not mentioned explicitly in this case, the 
manner of legal finding of the ECJ is absolutely comparable with situations 
concerning a fundamental human right. The treaty of the WHO was referred 
to in the preamble of the directive. 
In BECTU, where the same directive had to be interpreted, the ECJ 
had recourse to another document in order to buttress the right to paid 
annual leave. In its national law, the UK limited the scope of the 
entitlements by introducing a minimum threshold of employment with the 
same employer for thirteen weeks. BECTU, a trade union in the 
broadcasting sector, did not accept this piece of legislation and submitted a 
breach of the directive. In its reasoning, the ECJ focused first on a 
grammatical or textual analysis of Article 7(1)1 of directive 93/104. The 
provision contains a clear and precise obligation to a specific result, paid 
annual leave of at least four weeks. Because the directive also leaves some 
room for national legislation and practice, the ECJ also had to take the 
purpose and the system of the directive into account. For this, the legal basis 
and the preamble of the directive need to be studied in detail. The directive 
aims to lay down minimum requirements. Article 17 of the directive allows 
for derogations, but only with respect to those explicitly mentioned in that 
provision. The ECJ also refers to the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of workers of 9 December 198938. On its own, 
the reference would be strange, because this Charter was deliberately meant 
to be a non-binding text by the government leaders of that time. The then 
British government of Margaret Thatcher refused to allow any kind of 
binding character with respect to that text. The Charter was, however, 
 
38  The Queen v. BECTU, supra note 36, para. 39. 
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mentioned explicitly in the preamble of directive 93/104. This fact was 
sufficient for the ECJ to take points 8 and 19 of that Charter into account. 
Those points refer to the enjoyment of sufficient health and safety 
conditions by employers and the entitlement to paid annual leave. 
Furthermore, the ECJ considers the right to paid annual leave to be “a 
particularly important principle of Community social law”.39 The text of 
directive 93/104 is sufficiently precise, derogations are allowed but within 
clear limits, and more favorable national provisions are allowed because of 
the favor-principle which is embedded in almost every European labor law 
directive.  
The precise role of the Community Charter in this case is not clear. It 
seems only to be an additional text of declaratory nature. The scheme and 
text of the directive is sufficiently precise in order to support the outcome of 
the case. Probably the Charter had some role in the ECJ’s framing of the 
right to paid annual leave as “a particularly important principle of 
Community social law”. The possibility of abuse by employers in the UK 
seems to be important as well. They could simply hire employees for less 
than thirteen weeks to evade the duty to allow paid annual leave.40 The part 
in the preamble of the directive that the improvement of workers’ health and 
safety should not be subordinated to purely economic arguments is as 
important as the reference to the non-binding Charter.  
Just like the Community Charter of 1989, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of 2000 was originally not meant to have any binding 
effect. Just as with the Community Charter, this did not prevent the ECJ 
from referring to the EU Charter in its case law. In the famous Laval case 
the right to take collective action was at stake.41 The ECJ made reference to 
several legal texts: the European Social Charter of 1961, Convention no 87 
of the ILO, the Community Charter of 1989, and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU of 2000. Those texts seem to have the same 
status, but the ECJ simply refers to Article 28 of the Charter of 2000. In this 
provision, the right to collective negotiations and the right to take collective 
action is seen as a fundamental right, but nevertheless only protected “in 
accordance with Community law and national law and practices”.42 This 
implies, according to the ECJ, that these rights may be subjected to 
 
39  Id., para. 43.  
40  Id., para. 51. 
41  Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and 
Others, [2007] ECR I-11767. 
42  Id., para. 90-91. 
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restrictions. They are therefore not absolute, as such restrictions are found in 
many national constitutions.  
The use of fundamental human rights in the Viking-case is not that 
different.43 Although this case was related to freedom of establishment and 
one might expect a difference in the approach of the ECJ towards 
establishment in comparison with free movement of services, this difference 
is non-existent at least with respect to the role of the rights of collective 
bargaining and collective action. This implies that fundamental human 
rights are not completely outside the scope of the EC-Treaty, they only are 
seen as ‘legitimate interests’ which may justify a restriction on other 
obligations in that Treaty. The confrontation between the fundamental 
freedoms and fundamental human rights takes place only at the justification 
stage. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU of 2000, which since 
the 1st of December 2009 has had a legally binding status, has been referred 
to several times in ECJ decisions. Even before December 2009 the Charter 
was used in the case law of the ECJ. It has increasingly become a 
competitor for the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers of 1989, although this last text is still mentioned explicitly in 
article 151 TFEU. This provision, concerning the legal base for the social 
policy of the EU, uses rather vague wording. Weiss rightly criticizes the 
words “having in mind”, and asks himself whether this is only ‘a point of 
orientation’ for the EU legislator in making labor law directives.44 A direct 
and binding application of a provision in a Charter is another matter.  
An important case after the 1st of December 2009, in which the facts, 
however, arose far before that date, is the case of Kücükdeveci.45 A German 
provision on the termination of the employment relationship by the 
employer contained a threshold: periods prior to the completion of the 
employee’s 25th birth year are not to be taken into account for the 
calculation of the notice period. Is this a case of age discrimination? The 
referring German court particularly pointed to primary EU law and directive 
2000/7846. But the ECJ, following its earlier case law47, holds “that the 
 
43  Case C-438-05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779. 
44  M. Weiss, ‘The politics of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in B. Hepple (ed.), 
Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context. International and Comparative 
Perspectives (2002), 74. 
45  Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [2010] ECR I-365. 
46  Council Directive 2000/78/EC, O J 2000 L 303/16.  
47  See especially Mangold Case, supra note 4. 
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directive does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field 
of employment and occupation, which derives from various international 
instruments and from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States”48. Here, the focus is not on primary or secondary EU law together 
with the fundamental freedoms, but rather the emphasis is placed on 
international instruments and constitutional traditions together with the 
fundamental freedoms.  
What is the purpose of this consideration of the ECJ? Is the purpose 
that the general principle of EU law at hand did already exist, and that 
details concerning the implementation of a directive are only more of a 
technical matter? Is the general principle already there, and the directive is 
only its specific expression? The ECJ refers to Article 21(1) of the EU 
Charter.49 Herein age discrimination is prohibited. An exception is not given 
in that provision as in the case of for example Article 28 of the Charter, 
dealing with the right of collective bargaining. This provision concerns 
freedom of association and the right of social action which has to be 
exercised in accordance with EU law and the national legislation and 
practices. The implication of Kücükdeveci is that a directive such as 
directive 2000/78 is important to determine whether a particular case falls 
within the scope of EU law. The principle of non-discrimination already 
existed before the directive 2000/78. The fundamental human rights in the 
Charter, however, cannot decide their scope by themselves. Here, other 
legal texts such as directives are of great importance and help for the ECJ to 
decide its cases.  
D. The Role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 
December 2009) 
I. Category I: Only a Supportive Role for the Fundamental 
Rights 
Several provisions of the EU Charter have been cited in many cases in 
the field of European labor law. There is an increasing tendency to invoke 
these provisions. In labor law, the following sub-fields are of importance in 
 
48  Kücükdeveci Case, supra note 45, para. 20. 
49  Id., para. 22. 
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this respect. Most cases (including pending cases) concern the working time 
directive and the right to paid annual leave.50 Age discrimination is a second 
important topic.51 Collective bargaining is also important.52 Other topics are 
equal treatment on the basis of sex53 and effective remedies for employees 
in the situation of transfer of undertaking.54 
In Rosenbladt55 the EU Charter itself was not mentioned. Age 
discrimination and the possibility of regulating the retirement age by 
collective bargaining are both covered. Therefore this case is important. Is a 
clause in a collective labor agreement whereby the labor contract of a person 
that has reached the age of 65 is automatically terminated compatible with 
directive 2000/78? The ECJ refers to Article 16 (b) of that directive which 
forces the Member States to declare clauses in (collective) contracts that are 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment null and void or to amend them. 
This provision implies, according to the ECJ, that an effective review of 
collective agreements by the (national) courts is a necessity. The referring 
German court in Rosenbladt expressed doubts that the aim in the collective 
agreement was a legitimate one. In its answer, the ECJ considered the right 
to bargain collectively to be a fundamental right56 and found that the wide 
discretion for the social partners in Germany had been used in a reasonable 
 
50  Case C-350/06, Schultz-Hoff v. Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, [ECJ 20 January 
2009] (Court decision not yet reported); Cases C-159/10 and C-160/10, Fuchs and 
Köhler v. Land Hessen, [ECJ 21 July 2011] (Court decision not yet reported); case C-
155/10, Williams and Others v. British Airways plc., [ECJ 14 September 2011] (Court 
decision not yet reported); case C-194/11, Natividad Martínez Álvarez v. Consejería 
de Presidencia, Justicia e Igualdad del Principado de Asturias, [ECJ 27 April 2011] 
(Court decision not yet issued); cases C-229/11 and C-230/11, Heimann and Toltschin 
v. Kaiser GmbH, [ECJ 16 May 2011] (Court decision not yet issued). 
51  Case C-236/09, Association Belge de Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others 
v. Conseil de ministres, [ECJ 1 March 2011] (Court decision not yet reported); case C-
45/09, Rosenbladt v. Ollerking Gebäudereinigungsges. mbH, [ECJ 12 October 2010] 
(Court decision not yet reported). 
52  Rosenbladt v. Ollerking, id.; case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, [ECJ 15 July 
2010] (Court decision not yet reported); case C-132/11, Tyrolean Airways v. 
Betriebsrat Bord der Tyrolean Airways, [ECJ 18 March 2011] (Court decision not yet 
issued). 
53  Case C-104/10, Kelly v. National University of Ireland, [ECJ 21 July 2011] (Court 
decision not yet reported. 
54  Case C-108/10, Scattolon v. Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca, [ECJ 6 
September 2011] (Court decision not yet reported). 
55  Rosenbladt v. Ollerking, supra note 51. 
56  In quoting case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, [ECJ 15 July 2010] (Court 
decision not yet reported). 
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way. As long as the collective agreement is not contrary to Articles 1 and 2 
of directive 2000/78, the German government may even declare that 
agreement to be of general application nationwide. In this case, the ECJ was 
respectful of the right to bargain collectively. Anyhow, this freedom seems 
to be subject to a kind of reasonableness criterion. The discretion of the 
social partners is not without limits. 
In the joint cases Fuchs and Köhler57 the same directive was 
interpreted by the ECJ. Here, the EU Charter was mentioned explicitly.58 
Both Fuchs and Köhler were civil servants and they wanted to remain in 
their positions after having reached the age of 65. They requested an interim 
measure to achieve this purpose. Again, the ECJ focused on the 
reasonableness and the existence of a legitimate aim for the German 
legislation whereby civil servants were forced to compulsorily retire at the 
age of 65. Member States have a large discretion in this respect. They are, 
however, not allowed to frustrate the prohibition of age discrimination in 
directive 2000/78. The ECJ then mentioned Article 15 (1) of the EU 
Charter, which contains the right to engage in work. Senior workers must 
also be able to participate in economic, cultural and social life. But the right 
balance between this aspect and opposing interests, such as encouraging 
recruitment of young workers, is to be made at the national level. This 
implies that the right mentioned in Article 15 (1) of the Charter is not of an 
absolute nature. The decision is made on the basis of earlier case law 
concerning retirement at the age of 65. 
In many cases the provisions in the Charter have had a non-decisive 
role. Danosa59 was a female member of the Board of Directors of a 
company. Could she be removed from her post by the supervisory board 
because she was pregnant? The ECJ strongly upholds the protection to 
pregnant women in several cases, no matter whether a woman is to be 
qualified as worker or self-employed under national legislation. The 
reference of the ECJ to Article 23 of the EU Charter is only of a supportive 
character here. The provision does not refer to pregnancy but only mentions 
the principle of equality between men and women in general. 
 
57  Fuchs and Köhler v. Land Hessen, supra note 50. 
58  Namely Art. 15(1) of the Charter (the right to work); Fuchs and Köhler v. Land 
Hessen, supra note 50. 
59  Case C-232/09, Danosa v. LKB Lîzings SIA, [ECJ 11 November 2010] (Court 
decision not yet reported). 
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In Kelly60 an applicant for a course on vocational training wanted 
more information on why his application was not successful in order to see 
whether he was discriminated, directly or indirectly, on the basis of sex61. 
One of the preliminary questions of the national court was that the potential 
right to disclosure of information of Mr. Kelly was eventually subject to the 
principle of confidentiality. In this context the ECJ confirmed that several 
EU legal acts are about confidentiality. It mentioned several directives. 
Finally it referred to Article 8 of the EU Charter and considered that the 
protection of personal data was ‘also’ provided for in that part of the 
Charter. Here, the Charter was referred to only in on the last occasion, and 
only as an additional means by which to interpret the principle of 
confidentiality. Again, this demonstrates that the provision in the Charter 
only has a supportive role.  
II. Category II: More than only a Supportive Role for Charter 
Provisions 
A more important role (rather than merely a supportive one) for a 
Charter provision is possible in case the EU legislator itself has made an 
omission. For example, the text of a directive might be incomplete or too 
vague and thus might go against one of the fundamental rights in the 
Charter. As it is now, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Charter provisions are of the same legal value as the Treaty itself; directives 
may not violate these provisions. In this sub-category, there is one example 
in the field of labor law. In the Belgian case ASBL,62 complaints were raised 
against a derogation in directive 2004/11363 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to, and 
supply of, goods and services.64 The derogation is about the use of sex as a 
factor in the calculation of premiums and benefits in insurance-related 
matters. The derogation in Article 5 (2) gives the Member States the 
possibility to decide to keep ‘proportionate’ differences in the premiums and 
benefits, where the use of sex is a determining factor, up to a certain date in 
2007 Accurate statistical figures will have to be used in this respect. The 
 
60  Kelly v. National University of Ireland, supra note 53. 
61  Id. 
62  Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others 
v. Conseil de ministres [ECJ 1 March 2011]. 
63  Council Directive 2004/113/EC, O J 2004 L 373/37. 
64  Id. 
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Belgian complainants, supported by the consumer organization ASBL, 
deemed this provision in the directive to be against the principle of equal 
treatment. The ECJ is of the opinion that the derogation as such is 
admissible, but that a temporal limitation ought to have been set. Without 
such a limitation, the directive would violate the objectives in Article 21 (1) 
(non-discrimination) and 23 (equality of men and women) of the EU 
Charter. The derogation would then exist indefinitely. It is possible that the 
ECJ referred to the two provisions of the Charter, because in the preamble 
of directive 2004/113 there is an explicit reference to these two. In my 
opinion, the reference to the preamble is still necessary in the process of 
decision making of the ECJ, because the scope of the Charter is unclear. 
Several Member States do not even accept the legally binding character of 
the Charter (e.g. the UK and Poland). The provisions of a directive 
including its preamble are needed to show that an order of events is within 
the scope of the Treaty. This is not different from the situation before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Another and more important case reminds us of the already mentioned 
balance of fundamental rights and the fundamental economic freedoms. In 
Commission v. Germany65 the ECJ had to decide whether two public 
procurement directives implementing the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services could stand in the way of the content of 
collective agreements freely negotiated by management and labor in 
Germany. That Member State, together with Denmark and Sweden, argued 
that because of their nature and subject matter, the awarding of contracts to 
implement a salary conversion to bodies or undertakings would fall outside 
the scope of directives 92/5066 and 2004/18.67 They used the case of 
Albany,68 where the ECJ decided that collective agreements do not fall 
under the scope of competition law, as a precedent. In an interesting opinion 
of the 14th of April 2010, Advocate-General Trstenjak pleaded for a strong 
role for the fundamental rights mentioned in the Charter. The ECJ, however, 
followed the reasoning of its earlier cases Viking and Laval. It carefully set 
out that Article 28 of the Charter had the same legal value as Treaty 
provisions. Nevertheless, an opening is left by Article 28: the right must be 
 
65  Commission v. Germany, supra note 56. 
66  Council Directive 92/50/EEC, O J 1992 L 209/1. 
67  Council Directive 2004/18/EC, O J 2004 L 134/114. 
68  Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, [1999] ECR I-5751. 
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exercised ‘in accordance with EU law’.69 This outcome proves that the ECJ 
prefers to balance fundamental rights and fundamental economic freedoms. 
The principle of proportionality is an important tool of the ECJ in this 
respect. First, it makes some observations on ‘the essence of the right to 
bargain collectively’.70 While enhancing the level of pensions to local 
authority employees is part of this essence, the designation of bodies and 
undertakings is not. Second, the ECJ prefers a ‘fair balance’ between the 
interests involved:71 A higher level of pensions and what I would call 
‘Europeanization’, namely the opening up of competition to the EU-level 
and the participation of bodies or undertakings from outside Germany in this 
levelling up of the pensions, must be reconciled. Preservation of elements of 
solidarity is perfectly possible in a procurement procedure, according to the 
ECJ. Hence, the ECJ basically reframes the issue. Solidarity is to be 
allowed, but borders are irrelevant within the EU. It seems that the Charter, 
however important it is, does not make a difference. Earlier elements from 
the Viking and Laval case law are applied. The real problem is the wide 
condition in Article 28 of the Charter: ‘in accordance with EU law’. This 
condition is so wide, that potentially anything decided at EU level can 
interfere with the right to collective bargaining.  
This development means that the tradition of the German federal 
government and the German labor courts to not interfere with provisions in 
collective agreements will have to change. Also, in the Netherlands there 
exists a longstanding practice not to interfere in the content of collective 
agreements concluded by representative organizations of workers and 
employers in case the agreement will be declared to be of general 
applicability by the Minister of Labor. Because of the existence of the 
Charter, courts hesitate to intervene in the content of a collective agreement. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ makes this perfectly possible. Collective bargaining 
does not seem to be an absolute fundamental human right. Important 
questions relate to what the ‘essence’ of collective bargaining is and to the 
use of the proportionality criterion in balancing rights. 
Let us have a look at two major examples in this respect and focus on 
the proportionality criterion: in the first place the joined cases Hennigs and 
 
69  This conditionality is qualified by M. Weiss as a ‘dramatic inconsistency’, supra note 
44, 85. 
70  Commission v. Germany, supra note 56, para. 49. 
71  Id., para. 52; here the ECJ refers to the earlier Schmidberger Case, supra note 27. 
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Mai72 and in the second place the case Prigge and others.73 In the first case 
two employees protested against a collective agreement for public sector 
contractual employees concerning the determination of their pay. The 
Federal Labor Court wanted to know whether the content of a collective 
agreement could violate the prohibition to discriminate on the basis of age 
in Article 21 of the Charter, especially in the light of Article 28 of the same 
document guaranteeing the right to bargain collectively. In the collective 
agreement at stake, basic pay in individual salary groups was determined by 
age categories. This is therefore a direct discrimination on the basis of age 
and this implies that the discrimination can only be justified by a legitimate 
aim. The means of achieving this aim must be appropriate and necessary 
(Article 6 (1) of directive 2000/78). A kind of proportionality criterion is 
written in the text of this provision of secondary EU law focusing on 
reasonableness, appropriateness, and necessity. This provision of secondary 
EU law is of central importance. A simple quotation of the famous cases 
Viking and Laval and the text of Article 28 of the Charter whereby 
collective bargaining must be exercised in compliance with EU law is a 
sufficient motivation for the ECJ, as is the statement that directive 2000/78 
is an expression of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age. 
Concerning the question of the presence of a legitimate aim in this case, the 
ECJ confirms that the rewarding of professional experience of all ages is a 
legitimate aim. Moreover, the criterion of length of service is in general an 
‘appropriate’ criterion. Only for those contractual employees that, on their 
appointment, are initially classified in an age group, the age criterion is not 
appropriate and necessary. Some account should be taken of their 
experience as well.74 For this limited group the collective agreements do not 
comply with EU law. It has become clear that age per se is a suspect 
criterion. This will have huge consequences for collective agreements 
practices in many Member States. The importance of a provision of merely 
a secondary EU law text in balancing two different human rights is striking. 
In the case Hennings and Mai, the question was also what the 
discretionary freedom for social partners to move only gradually from a pay 
 
72  Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10, Hennings v. Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin v. 
Mai, [ECJ 8 September 2011] (Court decision not yet reported). 
73  Case C-447/09, Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, [ECJ 13 September 
2011] (Court decision not yet reported). 
74  In paragraph 77 of the ‘Henning and Mai case’ the ECJ even appears to give an 
advice: “a criterion also based on length of service or professional experience but 
without resorting to age” would be a better criterion. 
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system based on age groups to one based on other criteria was. Here the ECJ 
accepted the important role of the social partners, which should have a 
broad discretion in the area of pay. The ‘transitional and temporary 
character’ of the ongoing discrimination is appropriate until a completely 
new system of pay is in place and does not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the aim.  
The case Prigge a.o. concerned Lufthansa pilots, whose employment 
relationship was terminated at the age of 60 because of a clause in a 
collective labor agreement. This case is an example that might lead to more 
interference by governments with the content of such agreements. In this 
case, two fundamental rights, the right not to be discriminated on the basis 
of age and the right to collective negotiation, had to be reconciled. 
Noteworthy is that the opinion of the Advocate-General Cruz Villalón and 
the decision of the ECJ do not run completely parallel. The directive 
2000/78, and not the provisions of the Charter, is at center stage both in the 
opinion and the decision. Article 16 sub (b) of the directive already states 
that collective agreements must respect the principle of non-discrimination 
of the directive. Again, Viking and Laval are mentioned by the ECJ in the 
same paragraph of its judgement as Article 28 of the Charter with little 
motivation. Both the Advocate-General and the decision of the ECJ 
successively pay attention to the three exceptions in the directive: the 
exception on public security in Article 2 (5), the exception concerning the 
nature of the occupation in Article 4 (1), and the exception concerning age 
discrimination in general in Article 6 (1). The main difference between the 
ECJ and its learned Advocate-General is that the ECJ does not pay a lot of 
attention to Article 6 because the clause in the German collective agreement 
is related to public security and safety, while the Advocate-General takes a 
strict approach with respect to the exception in Article 2 (5) and therefore 
needs more room for an analysis under Article 6 (1). According to the 
Advocate-General, public security should always be dealt with by a public 
authority and not by social partners. The Advocate-General applies the test 
of ‘necessity’ in Article 2 (5) of the directive not only in the sense of 
checking the proportionality of the measure in relation to its purpose, but 
much further in the sense that only public authorities are able to decide what 
‘security’ is. This view, if it had been adopted by the ECJ, would have had 
huge consequences for the rights of social partners throughout the EU. A 
limitation of the scope of collective bargaining would then have been 
adopted at EU-level. The ECJ did not accept this view, but forced the 
collective partners to be precise and transparent in their rules concerning 
security.  
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It becomes clear that the proportionality principle is the main vehicle 
available for the ECJ to balance economic freedoms with fundamental rights 
or two different fundamental rights. If a proportionality criterion is written 
explicitly in a secondary EU law directive, the ECJ prefers to use that 
criterion. The sensitive balancing of fundamental rights itself is not 
explicitly addressed. The ECJ is only operating through existing directives. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights did not bring many changes at all in this 
respect. The problem is the wording of Article 28 of the Charter and Article 
16 sub (b) of the directive 2000/78. Not so much the ECJ, but rather the EU 
legislator is at the basis of this development by classifying some 
fundamental human rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, less 
fundamental than other rights such as non-discrimination, for example on 
the basis of age. This will without doubt lead to less autonomy for national 
labor law75. Some individual fundamental rights will get preference over 
collective labor law. I fully agree with Bernard Ryan in this respect and I 
cannot but quote him: “the danger is that an overemphasis on the protection 
of fundamental rights may obscure, or even undermine, alternative 
arguments for the extensive recognition of collective labor rights, deriving 
from inequality of income and social power”.76  
III. Category III: A Short Look at Pending Cases 
Some still pending cases could shed more light on the balancing of 
fundamental rights and the role of the Charter. In Tyrolean Airways77 the 
non-discrimination principle in Article 21 of the Charter is used to criticize 
an Austrian national collective agreement in which the classification of 
older workers for their remuneration was supposedly indirectly 
discriminatory because of age. Moreover, the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck 
also wants to know whether clauses in individual employment contracts 
may be declared null and void, when they are indirectly discriminatory on 
the ground of age. The words used in this preliminary question show already 
that national courts change their approach to collective agreements. This 
 
75  See also J. Kenner in his book review of P. Syrpis, EU intervention in domestic labour 
law (2007), 37 Industrial Law Journal (2008) 2, 189. 
76  B. Ryan, ‘The Charter and Collective Labour Law’, in T. K. Hervey & J. Kenner 
(eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a 
Legal Perspective (2003), 90.  
77  Tyrolean Airways v. Betriebsrat Bord der Tyrolean Airways, supra note 52. 
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case is of great importance, because it may lead to more interference with 
collective agreements. 
In the joined cases Heimann and Toltschin78 the question whether a 
lawful order to work short-time (because of the economic crisis) may also 
lead to a decrease in the paid annual leave guaranteed in Article 31 (2) of 
the Charter. And what about a reduction of work to zero hours - does this 
imply that there is no paid annual leave at all? Finally, in Antonopoulos79 
four provisions of the Charter are mentioned.80 Is the principle of non-
discrimination in the pursuit of trade union rights at stake now that trade 
union officials with a contract of indefinite duration are treated differently 
from those officials with a fixed-term contract? This case is also about the 
criterion of comparability for the purpose of non-discrimination laws. 
Furthermore, the question whether (non-)payment of remuneration to 
workers during leave of absence from work on trade union business reminds 
us of earlier case-law concerning the same situation with members of works 
councils.81  
E. Conclusion 
Is the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights in its binding character after 
the 1st of December 2009 adding anything to the existing case law? Can it 
be seen as an autonomous source of law, standing on its own? Are 
fundamental human rights now better protected than before the Lisbon-
Treaty? An overview of recent case law does not suggest a revolutionary 
impact of the now binding character of the EU Charter. The ECJ is not 
changing its weighing of fundamental human rights and fundamental 
economic freedoms substantially. Pending cases, however interesting they 
are, will very probably not change this. Although the remark by the ECJ in 
BECTU that paid annual leave should not be subordinated to purely 
economic considerations was a promising one, economic arguments related 
to free movement within the EU are of continuing importance. Labor law, 
quite autonomous in the national setting, has to interact with the rules of the 
 
78  Heimann and Toltschin v. Kaiser GmbH, supra note 50. 
79  Case C-363/11, Commissioner oft he Court of Auditors at the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism v. Antonopoulus, [ECJ 7 July 2011] (Court decision not yet issued). 
80  These are Arts 12 (freedom of assembly and association), 20 (equality before the law), 
21 (non-discrimination) and 28 (collective negotiations and collective action).  
81  Cases C-360/90, Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin v. Bötel, [1992] ECR I-3589 and 
C-278/93, Freers and Speckmann v. Deutsche Post, [1996] ECR I-1165.  
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internal market at EU-level.82 The fundamental human rights are subject to a 
proportionality test, limited to their proper purpose and to a certain extent 
reframed and europeanized, opened up until the EU external borders. It is 
important that the ECJ shows some self-restraint in the balancing of 
fundamental freedoms and fundamental human rights and in the balancing 
of two different fundamental human rights. A not too intrusive 
proportionality criterion that protects the ‘essence’ of, for example, the right 
to collective bargaining, is essential. A test limited to ‘appropriateness’ and 
‘necessity’ is needed in this respect. Increasingly, the ECJ uses the 
proportionality criteria mentioned in directives such as directive 2000/78, 
also to balance two fundamental human rights. The right to collective 
bargaining seems to be less important than the right to non-discrimination 
on the basis of age. National governments and national courts will probably 
intervene more in this process when declaring collective agreements to be of 
general applicability. This is a consequence not so much of the decisions of 
the ECJ, but of the deliberate choice of words by the EU legislator in Article 
28 of the Charter and article 16, sub (b) of directive 2000/78. 
The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 did not 
change much in this respect. On their own, the fundamental rights in the 
Charter cannot change the powers and competencies of the EU. The ECJ 
will continue its balancing as it did before December 2009. The Charter 
seems to be primarily a codifying instrument.  
 
82  See also S. Sciarra, ‘Market freedom and fundamental social rights’, in B. Hepple 
(ed.), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context. International and Comparative 
Perspectives (2002), 99.  
